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Abstract 
This paper examines the Granger causal relationship between corruption and poverty 
with panel data of 9 ASEAN countries during the period of observation 2005-2009. It 
uses the generalized method of moments/dynamic panel data (GMM/DPD) and 
focuses on capability poverty using human development index (HDI). The major 
results show that poverty does not affect corruption meanwhile corruption causes 
poverty. There is unidirectional causality, from corruption to poverty. 
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1. Introduction 
Corruption, an extra ordinary crime, is a kind of everlasting developing 
countries’ problem. It is commonly defined as the misuse of public affair for private 
gain, including but not limited to: corruption, nepotism, bribery, extortion, influence 
peddling and fraud (Chetwynd et al, 2003). In Indonesia, corruption has been around 
for years and increased dramatically in recent years. It distorts markets and the 
allocation of resources (Tanzi, 1998). A simple question is sometimes addressed: who 
is the poor? The answers to this question are still debatable. There are some 
definitions of poor people. However, defining poverty is a matter of social convention 
(Pradhan 2000:2). An accepted definition of poverty, unlike the presence of its real 
problem, is somehow hard to define. There are a lot of definitions of poverty which 
can be used to different countries or regions and at all times, independent of the social 
structure and level of development (Meier, 1995:26). Some would go into a 
pragmatic conclusion by looking at poverty as merely contextual and cannot be 
conceptualized since the notion of ‘being poor’ or ‘feeling poor’ can be very 
subjective. However, for analytical and policy purposes, a rigorous definition is 
necessary. In Indonesia, there were at least three definitions of poverty line in most 
highly publicized research. The first one was the official measurement from the 
Indonesian Central Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS). The second one 
was a measurement proposed by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP).  The third measurement was 
published by the World Bank, SMERU – a non-governmental organization funded by 
the World Bank – and a joint study by RAND Graduate School and Demographic 
Institute, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia.  
Poverty is obviously about more than insufficient income. It is also related to 
the access to and quality of public services vital to the poor such as health, education, 
water, infrastructures and sanitation. It is also about lack of opportunities, lack of 
access to information, lack of voice and lack of representation. The relationship 
between corruption and poverty is complex. In macroeconomic level, corruption 
affects poverty through lowering, economic growth, reducing foreign and domestic 
investment, distorting market, hindering competition, and increasing income 
inequalities (Chetwynd et al, 2003). Corruption is likely to increase poverty because 
it reduces the potential income earning of the poor. Therefore, eradicating corruption 
is a crucial issue in the poverty reduction process. Alternatively, poverty which is 
usually indicated by low income, low education and health, vulnerability and 
powerlessness, invites corruption. Social and income inequalities in poor countries 
make greater imbalances in the distribution of power and encourage corruption 
(Ndikumana, 2006). A rational agent will be corrupt as long as the private income 
gained from corruption is equal or outweighs its private cost, because it will improve 
his/her welfare (Yaru and Aminu, 2009).  
While many studies have examined the relationship between corruption and 
poverty, the question of whether a causal relationship exist between corruption and 
poverty based on panel data models, has received less attention. Thus, the policy 
recommendation for combating poverty and corruption can simply be wrong. Taking 
it to the limit, particularly for ASEAN countries, how good they try to decrease 
corruption by implementing anti poverty strategies if the high poverty level simply 
caused by high corruption and not the other way around. As we know, most of 
countries joined in ASEAN (Association of the South East Asia Nations) are 
developing countries. Based on the Survey of Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) in 2009, the ASEAN countries except Singapore, Brunei 
Darussalam and Malaysia, placed on the group of worst level of the corrupted 
countries in the world. This paper intends to examine the Granger causal relationship 
between corruption and poverty by a panel data of 9 ASEAN countries from 2005 to 
2009, the period of ASEAN-Free Trade Area (AFTA).   
 
2. Literature Review 
Poverty is not the same with inequality. Whereas poverty is related to the absolute 
standard of living of a part of society – the poor – inequality refers to relative living 
standard across the whole society. At maximum inequality, poverty is high. In 
contrast, minimum inequality is possible with zero poverty (where no one is poor) as 
well as with maximum poverty (where all are poor). The perception of poverty has 
changed tremendously and evolved historically from culture to culture. Criteria for 
determining poor and non-poor tend to express particular national priorities and 
normative concepts of welfare and rights. It is common that as countries become 
wealthier, their perception of the acceptable poverty line changes. 
What is poverty? A simple definition of poverty is the inability to attain a 
minimal standard of living (Meier 1995:26). Similarly, it is the inability of an 
individual or a family to command sufficient resources to satisfy basic needs (Fields 
1994:88). It delivers a commonly shared idea of poverty as a state of deprivation. 
Despite giving a general idea, such definition also provides more issues to explore. 
This opens the room for some possible approaches in discussing poverty. 
 Studies on the causal relationship between corruption and poverty have been 
carried out intensively. Basically, there are two competing theories in exploring such 
a linkage. The first theory argues that corruption affects poverty but not the other way 
around. There is unidirectional causality from corruption to poverty. Corruption 
affects the poor directly since it increases the cost of public services, lowers quality of 
public services and often restricts poor people’s access to public services (health, 
education, etc). Corruption also indirectly affects the poor because corruption is an 
impediment to economic growth, distorts public expenditure allocation, etc. In 
contrast to the first theory, the second theory points out that corruption and poverty 
go together, with bidirectional causality. Study by Gupta et al (1998) provides some 
theoretical framework showing that corruption increases income inequality and 
poverty such as reduced economic growth; biased tax systems favoring the rich and 
well connected; poor targeting of social programs; the use of wealth by the well to do 
to lobby government for favorable policies that perpetuate inequality in asset 
ownership and lower social spending. The relationship between corruption and 
income inequality also arises from rent-seeking theory and the ideas of Rose-
Ackerman (1978). Lambsdorff (1999) argues that the benefits from corruption are 
likely to accrue to the well-connected at the expense of the poor. According to Gupta 
et al (1998), corruption increases income inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. In a cross section of 37 countries, a significant positive impact of 
corruption on inequality was found, while taking into account various other 
exogenous variables. When controlling GDP per head, this impact remains significant 
at 10% level. It was concluded that deterioration in a country’s corruption index of 
2.5 points on a scale of 0 to 10 is associated to the same increase in the Gini 
coefficient as a reduction in average secondary schooling of 2.3 years. 
N’zue and N’Guessan (2005) also investigated the direction of causality 
between poverty and corruption by using a panel of 18 countries during the 1996-
2001 time periods. The empirical evidence shows that poverty measured by Human 
Development Index (HDI) does not cause corruption and corruption does not cause 
poverty. When the poverty measured by income inequality, the results show uni-
directional causality. That is, inequality does not cause corruption but corruption 
causes inequality. On the opposite, Negin et al  (2010) investigate the Granger causal 
relationship between corruption and poverty. Based on a sample of 97 developing 
countries during 1997-2006, their empirical findings reveal that corruption and 
poverty are along together, with bidirectional causality. In their study, the poverty 
was measured by Human Poverty Index (HPI). You and Khagram (2005) show that 
income inequality also raises the level of material corruption, as well as normative 
mechanisms. Their analysis of 129 countries using 2-SLS methods with difference of 
3 instrumental variables supports their hypotheses using different measures of 
corruption. Because income inequality also contributes to corruption, societies often 
fall into vicious circles of inequality and corruption. 
 
3. Model Specification 
This paper uses the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to 
examine the Granger causality between corruption and poverty by controlling the 
potential bias that may come from endogeneity of some repressors, including the 
lagged dependent variable. Our basic specification is in the following form: 
 Where the causality-based variables comprising x and y in which each 
corruption and poverty. Major control variables (z) act as mediator between 
corruption and poverty namely inflation and gender. Then, uit is an error term. In 
panel estimation, neither the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator nor the 
Fixed Effect (FE) estimator will produce consistent estimates in the presence of 
endogenous and dynamics regressors (Baltagi 1995). Arellano and Bond (1991) have 
proposed a dynamic panel General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator with an 
instrument variable (IV) estimator that uses all past values of endogenous regressors 
as well as current values of strictly exogenous regressors. Estimates can be based on 
first difference, or on orthogonal deviations.  
Arellano-Bond estimation takes the first step by transforming all regressors, 
usually through differentiation and uses the Generalized Method of Moments to be 
called as difference GMM. The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator augments 
Arellano-Bond by making an additional assumption, that first differences of 
instrument variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This allows the 
introduction of more instruments, and can dramatically improve efficiency. It builds a 
system of two equations-the original equation as well as the transformed one- and is 
known as system GMM. It is preferred to difference GMM since finite sample bias 
problem caused by weak instruments in first differenced GMM will be addressed by 
using system GMM. It also offers forward orthogonal deviations, an alternative to 
differencing that preserves sample size in panels with gaps. It allows finer control 
over the instrument matrix. 
 
4. Data and Variable Definitions 
We analyze the link between corruption and poverty based on a panel of 9 
ASEAN countries for the 2005 to 2009 time periods. The data were obtained from the 
Transparency International, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World 
Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). To 
measure corruption, we used the Transparency International corruption perception 
index (CPI). The data is yearly and scored from 0 to 10, where zero means higher 
corruption. Ten refers to a corruption-free country. Table 1 shows the CPI scores of 9 
ASEAN countries for 2005-2009 provided by Transparency International. 
Table 1 about here.  
To measure poverty, we used the Human Development Index (HDI) published 
by UNDP. This HDI represents indicators such as education and adult literacy, life 
expectancy and household income to come up with an indexed score to show where 
moreover 150 countries fall on the development spectrum (high, medium or low). 
Moreover, the data on consumption and income could not truly capture the state of 
poverty in the countries being studied. We focus on capability poverty using Human 
Development Index (HDI) since it portrays in a more accurate way the state of 
poverty. 
To assess the correlation between both corruption and poverty, we put Zi 
variables which consist of inflation rate and gender. Inflation, as one of the aspects of 
macroeconomic instability, is a regressive tax, which its burden is especially carried 
by those in lower income groups since the poor tend to hold most of their wealth in 
the form of cash, and also they are commonly less able than the rich to secure the real 
value of their incomes and wealth from inflation (Negin et al, 2010). Therefore, price 
increases generally erode the real wages and assets of the poor more than those that 
belong to the rich.  
Higher cost of monitoring the agent is generated by agent behavior in inflating 
the price of goals which is required to start an investment project. So it causes higher 
corruption and lower investment (Braun and Di Tella, 2000). Gender is considered as 
one of control variables. Women’s participation in public sector reduces corruption in 
business and government. Several studies show that in countries whit high gender 
equality, the level of corruption is lower (Dollar and Gatti, 1999). Those aspects 
conform to the comparative studies the comparative study among countries with the 
same civil liberties, education, legal institutions, and GDP. Then, in order to lower 
the level of corruption, it may be better to design policies to improve the role of 
women in public life. Gender disparities are not only inequitable but also have 
economic consequences such as slowing down growth and increasing poverty. 
Evidences show that growth and social development significantly affects poverty 
outcomes. It means that for ultra-poor households, women have crucial role to 
prevent increasing their poverty (Negin et al, 2010). 
Alatas et al (2007) also explores behavioral differences by gender across 
countries and find that there are larger variations in women’s behavior towards 
corruption than in men’s across the countries in our sample. Bowman and Giligan 
(2008) examine the possible relationship between gender and perceptions of 
corruption within Australia. Their study suggests that, in general, Australian women 
appear to be less tolerant of corrupt scenarios than their male counterparts, although 
gender difference was not automatic across all scenarios. The results suggest that it 
seems gender dimension with respect to perceptions of corruption. 
 
5. Empirical Results  
The Granger causality between corruption and poverty is explored by using 
two steps GMM method with t-values and test statistics that are asymptotically robust 
to general heteroscedasticity and corrected for a small sample bias. To investigate 
Granger causality relationship between corruption and poverty, two cases are 
considered: (i) corruption does not Granger-cause poverty, and (ii) poverty does not 
Granger-cause corruption. 
 The empirical results of the poverty equations are presented in Table 2 where 
each column presents different specifications of the poverty equation. In all models 
the interest variable is corruption. In specification 1, there is no control variable; in 
specification 2, gender (female labor force participation rate) is used as a control 
variable. In specification 3, inflation is added to gender as the other control variable. 
Since all other regressors in these models are not strictly exogenous, in all 
specification, year dummies and levels equation are used as instrument variables. For 
all specifications, the lags length of corruption is two and the lags length of 
dependent variable (poverty) is one. The results in all specifications suggest that there 
is a significant relationship between corruption and poverty. 
Table 2 about here. 
 In specification 2 and 3, the coefficient of gender is positive and significant 
(at 1% level and 5% level, respectively) indicating that women have crucial role 
either to prevent poverty or to increase society welfare. The result is consistent to 
Subbarao and Ezemenari (1995) and Negin et al (2010). The inflation has a 
statistically significant negative effect (1% level) on human development index in the 
specification 3 which is consistent with Ames et al (2002) and Negin et  al (2010).  
Two types of diagnostic test are used for validity of the empirical models; 
they are Sargan test and Instrument Rank. Those tests identify restrictions under the 
null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Based 
on the Sargan test statistic for all models, high p-value indicates that the null 
hypothesis of no over-identifying restrictions fails to reject. Therefore, the Sargan test 
statistics indicates that all specifications are well specified and that the instrument 
vector is appropriate. The instrument rank of 11 is greater than the number of 
estimated coefficients (6, 7 and 8) also give the same conclusion. 
Table 3 about here. 
We also investigate the direction of causality between poverty and corruption. 
If the null hypothesis of no causality is rejected, then one may conclude that 
corruption causes poverty. The empirical evidence in Table 2 shows that poverty does 
not cause corruption, meanwhile corruption causes poverty. Since the result 
confidently confirms that only corruption causes poverty, whereas poverty does not 
cause corruption, we do not need to test the corruption equation. Corruption could 
affect directly the poor since it lead to increase the prices of public services, lower 
quantity and quality of public services, hamper poor people’s access public services 
(health care, water, sanitation, education and other public services). It also might 
deform poor people’s relationship with and trust for public officials, the police and 
people in authority who force bribes from them. Corruption also affects indirectly 
through lowering economic growth, reinforcing income inequality, distorting public 
expenditure allocation. In macro level, corruption has implications for a country’s 
ability to attract investment, for the effectiveness of its institutions, for income 
generation through taxation and hence in the economic growth and poverty 
alleviation. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper examines the causal relationship between corruption and poverty.  
By focusing on capability poverty using the HDI, the empirical findings suggest that 
corruption affects poverty, but poverty does not affect corruption. Hence, it is 
necessary to address the integrated strategies to alleviate poverty and corruption. In 
other words, the attempts to reduce poverty must be complemented by serious efforts 
to reduce corruption.  This study suggests strategy to attempt to reducing corruption. 
If it is carefully crafted, anti-corruption programs might yield important poverty 
reduction, especially if they followed by increasing economic growth, creating more 
equitable income distribution, strengthening governance institutions and capacity, 
improving government services especially in health and education, and also 
increasing public trust in government (Chetwynd et al, 2003).  To reduce corruption, 
the strategies also need action on at least four fronts (Tanzi, 1998): (i) Honest and 
visible commitment by leadership to fight against corruption. The leadership must 
zero tolerance for it; (ii) Policy changes that reduce the demand for corruption by 
scaling down regulations and other policies such as tax incentives and by making 
those that are retained as transparent and as no-discretionary as possible. Discretion 
must be kept to the minimum; (iii) Reducing the supply of corruption by increasing 
public sector wages, by increasing incentives toward honest behavior, and by 
instituting effective controls and penalties on public servants; and (iv) Somehow 
solving the problem of the financing of political parties. 
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 Table 1. Corruption Perception Index 
 
Countries 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Cambodia 1.5 2.3 2.1 2 1.8 
Indonesia 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.8 
Lao PDR 3.4 3.3 2.6 1.9 2 
Malaysia  5.1 5 5.1 5.1 4.5 
Myanmar 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.4 1.3 
Philippines 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 
Singapore 9.3 9.2 9.3 9.2 9.2 
Thailand 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.4 
Vietnam 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 
Source: Transparency International. 
 Table2: The Estimated Results from the Two Step Dynamic Panel 
GMM-SYS (Effects of Corruption on Poverty) 
Dependent log(HDI)t Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
log(HDI)t-1 1.227 
(7.13)*** 
1.411 
(13.86)*** 
1.66 
(10.44)*** 
log(CPI)t -0.057 
(-1.38) 
-0.052 
(-2.19)** 
0.13 
(1.48)* 
log(CPI)t-1 0.138 
(2.07)** 
0.016 
(0.45) 
-0.019 
(-0.57) 
log(CPI)t-2 -0.122 
(-2.15)** 
-0.013 
(-0.55) 
0.025 
(1.37) 
log(Gender)t  3.201 
(4.35)*** 
4.13 
(2.40)** 
Inflation 
 
  -82.38 
(-3.01)*** 
dummy2005 
 
   
dummy2006 
 
   
dummy2007 
 
   
dummy2008 -3937.085 
(15.03)*** 
-5122.649 
(-15.96)*** 
-4653.215 
(-6.62)*** 
dummy2009 701.3394 
(2.41)** 
1517.382 
(7.08)*** 
1957.230 
(2.69)** 
 
 
   
No. Observation 100 100 100 
Sargan test, (p value) 4.906 3.138 2.628 
Instrument rank 11 11 11 
Notes: All models are estimated Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations. Figures 
in the parentheses are t-statistics. *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent 
level and * significant at the 10 percent level. 
 Table 3. Granger Causality Tests Results 
Hypotheses Model 
Corruption does not cause Poverty 4.801 
(0.01)*** 
Poverty does not cause Corruption 1.979 
(0.15) 
Number in parantheses are P-value of the statistics. A triple asterisk is an indication of significance at 
the 1% level. 
 
 
APPENDIX. Sources and Characteristics of Sample Data 
Variables Unit of 
Measure
ment 
Abbrevia
tion 
Mean SD Min Max Data 
Source 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
0-10 CPI 3.57 2.15 1.3 9.3 TI 
Inflation % Inflation 6.63 7.18 -0.8 35 World 
Bank 
Female 
Labor Force 
Participation 
Rate 
% Gender 43.13 48.45 34.99 50.58 UNCTAD 
Human 
Development 
Index 
% HDI 0.68 0.14 0.44 0.94 UNDP 
 
 
